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Intervenor Holladay Citizens for Progress ("Holladay Citizens") hereby submits 
this Reply Brief to respond to the Appellate Briefs of Mayor Dennis Larkin (the 
"Mayor") and Intervenor Holladay Preservation League (the "League"). This Court 
should reject the Mayor's and the League's arguments, declare that the Resolution was 
properly passed by the Holladay City Council, and declare that the City of Holladay's 
election held on August 5, 2003 to change its form of municipal government is valid. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Only the City Council Can Pass a Resolution Under Section 1203. 
Despite the fact that the Mayor (1) has no authority to disapprove resolutions, (2) 
has no veto power, (3) is specifically precluded from voting in council meetings, and (4) 
has no "legislative" authority, the Mayor and the League argue that the Mayor has some 
implied power to reject a resolution considered under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1203(3)(a) 
("Section 1203"). Specifically, the Mayor and the League argue that term "governing 
body" in Section 1203 includes the Mayor and thus he must be empowered, somehow, to 
directly impact the passage of such a resolution by vote, veto, or otherwise.1 
1
 The Mayor and the League cannot articulate the exact nature of the power they 
believe the Mayor has. Is it a right to vote equal to that held by each individual Council 
member? Is it a right to vote equal to the entire vote of the Council? Is it a veto power or 
a disapproval power? Is it a right to "reject"? Is it something else? Throughout their 
briefs, the Mayor and the League describe this authority in inconsistent ways. (See, e.g., 
League Br. at 24 ("It is an original duty, and not a veto action); id. at 26 ("[Section 1203] 
could therefore act itself as an authorization of veto power"); Mayor Br. at 15 ("[Section 
1214] is a mechanism for mayoral approval entirely apart from either a city council 
meeting vote or a veto"). 
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To reach this conclusion, the Mayor and the League strain the language of the 
relevant statutes, ignore the Utah legislature's intent in creating the council-mayor form 
of government, consider as "immaterial" and "irrelevant" specific legislative restrictions 
on mayoral powers, and conjure up new mayoral powers not found in the Utah Code. 
Whatever authority the Mayor and the League believe the Mayor has to void the passage 
of the Resolution, no such authority exists. 
The Mayor and the League first argue that the term "governing body" in Section 
1203 is defined as both the Mayor and the Council. Initially, this is an irrelevant 
argument. As discussed in Section II.A.2.C, the legislature's use of the term "governing 
body" is in its "generic sense only and not an attempt to designate the functions of any 
particular governing body:' Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022,1028 (Utah 1978). 
Thus, defining the Mayor as part of this "generic" governing body (with no additional 
powers) is meaningless because it does not help resolve whether the Mayor has been 
given the authority to vote on, veto, disallow, or otherwise reject a resolution under 
Section 1203. 
Even if the council-mayor form of government had to be defined in terms of 
having a single "governing body" other than in a generic sense, that body would be the 
City Council. Utah law states: "Unless otherwise provided,... in a city of the . . . fourth 
class, the governing body is the city council." Utah Code Ann. § 10-l-104(3)(b). 
Despite this clear language, the Mayor argues that he is part of the governing body by 
relying on the preceding language in § 10-1-104(3) which states: "'Governing Body' 
means collectively the legislative body and the executive of any municipality." Because 
the Mayor is the executive, he claims that this statute includes him as a member of the 
"governing body." If Holladay City had the traditional form of government, the Mayor 
would be correct. Section 10-3-105 of the Utah Code provides that "the governing body 
of each city of the third . . . class that has not adopted an optional form of government 
under [the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act]', shall be a council composed 
of six members, one of whom shall be the mayor and the remaining five shall be council 
members." 
However, Holladay has adopted an optional form of government. Section 10-3-
105 makes cleair that in municipalities operating under an optional form of government, 
the mayor is not & member of the Council. Thus, even though § 10-3-105 excludes the 
Mayor from the City Council, the Council would still the governing body pursuant to § 
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1. The Mayor's and the League's Interpretation of Section 1203 Ignores 
the Legislature's Explicit Limitations on the Mayor's Power. 
The Mayor's and the League's argument fails as a matter of statutory construction. 
Specifically, the implied power that they read into Section 1203 would be in direct 
conflict with the limitations of mayoral power in Sections 1214 and 1219. Section 1214 
allows the Mayor to disapprove only "ordinance[s] and tax lev[ies]." Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1214. This provision does not mention, and thus withholds from the Mayor, any 
power to disapprove "resolutions." 
In addition, Section 1219(2)(g) withholds from the Mayor the right to vote at 
council meetings. Id. § 10-3-1219(2)(g). The League claims that Section 1219(2)(g) 
only precludes the Mayor from voting on "run-of-the-mill, everyday decisions of the city 
council." (League Br. at 22.) Section 1219(g)(2) contains no such limitation. To the 
contrary, this statute is a complete bar from voting, without exception. 
These provisions limiting the Mayor's powers cannot be ignored. When 
interpreting statutes, "the more specific provision will govern over that which is more 
10-3-104(3)(b), because no alternative definition of governing body is "otherwise 
provided." 
Rejecting this conclusion, the Mayor asserts that the definition of governing body 
is "otherwise provided" in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(a), which is the statute 
defining the council-mayor form of government. The Mayor is again mistaken. While 
this provision sets forth the organization of a council-mayor form of government, 
nowhere does it use the term "governing body" let alone define it differently than in 
Section 10-3-104(3)(b). 
3
 The League also suggests that § 1219(2)(g) would not preclude the Mayor from 
voting "outside a city council meeting." (League Br. at 23.) Nowhere in the Utah Code 
are any elected municipal officials authorized to vote outside of council meetings. 
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general." Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 993 P.2d 875, 879 (Utah 1999). Moreover, 
"statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of the another." Id. Applying these two principles of statutory construction to 
this case, Sections 1214 and 1219, which specifically define and limit mayoral powers, 
govern over what would be an undefined and implied power found in Section 1203.4 
2. Section 1203 Must Be Interpreted to Give Meaning to the Legislature's 
Intent that the Council-Mayor Form of Government Be Based on an 
"Absolute Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers." 
a. The Mayor's and the League's Arguments Ignore the 
Legislature's Intent 
The Utah Optional Forms of Government Act (the "Act") defines the council-
mayor system as follows: 
The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests 
the government of a municipality that adopts this form in two separate, 
independent, and equal branches of municipal government: the executive 
branch consisting of a mayor an the administrative departments and 
officers; and the legislative branch, consisting of a municipal council. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(a). It is undisputed that the legislature's sole intent in 
creating this council-mayor system was to create and make available to municipalities a 
form of government based upon the complete separation of the legislative and executive 
branches. According to this Court: 
4
 These two statutes are complimented by Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-402 (mayor 
cannot vote) and -404 (mayor cannot veto unless specifically authorized), both of which 
are consistent with §§ 10-3-1204 and-1219(2)(g). See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1204 
("All existing statutes governing municipalities shall remain applicable except as 
provided in this part."). 
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When the Act is read in its entirely, and each provision thereof is read in 
context with all of the others, and when viewed in the light of the 
legislative history of municipal government in Utah, we are compelled to 
conclude that it in fact provides for the absolute separation of executive and 
legislative powers. A fortiori, the 1977 modifications to the Act 
specifically vest the whole of the executive powers in the Mayor and the 
legislative powers in the Council, and we consequently hold that the 
council-mayor form of government... is a true separation of powers form 
of government. 
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
Within this system, all legislative power is vested solely within the legislative 
body and all executive power is vested solely within the executive body. Id. at 1027. 
("[T]he Council is vested with all legislative powers.") There can be no wavering on this 
point. In Martindale, this Court agreed that the Act "when properly interpreted, provides 
for a complete separation of executive and legislative branches . . . because the Act is 
patterned after the absolute separation of powers doctrine set forth in the federal and state 
constitutions." Id. at 1024 (emphasis added); seeBiddle, 993 P.2d at 879 ("[T]he [Act] 
emphasized the legislature's intent to clearly separate executive and legislative powers."). 
The Mayor's and the League's argument ignores this intent. In fact, their 
argument assumes the opposite: to reach their conclusion, the Court would have to bridge 
the separation of powers by interpreting Section 1203 as an implied grant of legislative 
power to the Mayor. The League admits this, claiming that "the policymaking/policy-
execution dichotomy may prove too little in this case." (League Br. at 27 (emphasis 
added).) Of course, not only can the legislature's intent not be ignored, but this Court's 
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"primary goal" is to honor and give meaning to that intent. Biddle, 993 P.2d at 879.5 
b. To Give Effect to the Legislature's Intent, Section 1203 Must Be 
Interpreted to Authorize the City Council Alone to Pass a 
Resolution Thereunder. 
In order to give meaning to the legislature's intent of an "absolute separation" of 
powers, the proper analysis for determining whether the authority to perform a particular 
governmental act rests with a city council or with a mayor is to evaluate the substantive 
nature of that act to determine whether it is legislative or executive in nature. See 
Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027-29 (employing this analysis and concluding that 
management of city property was an executive power, thus falling to the mayor). 
As discussed in Holladay's initial Appellate Brief, changing forms of government 
(which the Mayor and the Council have properly analogized as being akin to amending a 
constitution) is legislative in nature because it is a policy-making decision and not an act 
of administration. {See Holladay Citizens' App. Br. at 13-16.) "[Ejxecutive power are 
policy execution powers. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is 
the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the 
duty to make such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. They are the acts 
necessary to carry out legislative policies and purposes and are deemed acts of 
administration" Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). 
5
 The League speculates that "it is entirely possible that given the importance of 
this issue, the LFtah Legislature wanted to include even more players in reaching such a 
decision than the standard policymakers in the legislative branch." There is nothing in 
the Act or in its legislative history that supports this argument. Instead, as discussed 
above and in Holladay Citizens' initial Appellate Brief, the plain language of § 10-3-
1209(l)(a) and § 10-3-101, and this Court's previous examination of the Act in 
Martindale and Biddle mandate the opposite conclusion. 
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This conclusion is so self-evident that the League does not dispute it, instead 
relying on other arguments to avoid it. (League Br. at 26-28.) In fact, the League 
acknowledges the legislative character of the Resolution by stating that "[altering the 
form of government is the most original, fundamental, formative act that can be taken by 
a democracy." (Id. at 2.) While the Mayor claims that a resolution "for a reorganization 
election partakes of both the policy making and the administrative or executory 
[functions]," he never explains how it is administrative or executory. (Mayor Br. at 19.) 
To the contrary, the Mayor concedes that such a decision: "is a formative, structural, 
fundamental alteration of government power." (Id.) In other words, it is a policy 
decision, not an executive function.6 
Under the council-mayor system, the Council holds all legislative powers to make 
policy decisions. The Mayor holds none. Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027 ("[T]he Council 
is vested with all legislative powers, and find full support for it in those provisions in the 
Act which specifically deprive the Mayor of Council membership or a vote thereon."). 
Thus, to give effect to the legislature's intent in creating the council-mayor system, only 
the City Council—as Holladay's legislative body—can be authorized to pass a resolution 
6
 While changing a form of government is certainly an important decision, the 
Mayor and the League suggest that it is disfavored. This is not correct. The whole 
purpose behind the Act was to allow experimentation: "The Legislature . . . finding that 
increasing demands for services and growing citizen awareness and concern have 
strained the ability of Utah's local governments to respond effectively, determines that 
there is a need to provide optional forms of municipal government under which citizens 
may vote to organize to meet their needs and demands." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1202. 
If one form of government did not meet those needs, the citizens of a municipality could 
adopt a new form four years later. Id. § 10-3-1206. 
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under Section 1203. 
Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the Mayor and the League identify a potential 
conflict between (1) allowing the City Council to call for a special resolution under 
Section 1203 without the Mayor and (2) Utah Code Ann. § 20A-l-203(5)(a). 
Specifically, the Mayor and the League argue that Section 1203 cannot be interpreted to 
allow the Council to pass a resolution thereunder without him because Utah Code Ann. § 
20A-l-203(5)(a) lists the "only" special elections that the Council alone can authorize. 
The Mayor and the League are mistaken. Section 10-3-1204 of the Utah Code 
states that "[a]ll existing statutes governing municipalities shall remain applicable except 
as provided in this part." (Emphasis added.) In other words, in any apparent conflict 
between a provision in the Act and a provision pertaining to municipalities generally, the 
Act prevails. Thus, Section 20A-l-203(5)(a) is not a bar to interpreting Section 1203 as 
empowering the City Council alone to pass a resolution authorizing a special election 
thereunder. 
c. The Term "Governing Body" in Section 1203 Is Generic Only 
and Does Not Bestow Upon the Mayor Additional Powers 
Beyond Those Which He Already Holds. 
Given the fundamental concept of separation of powers in the council-mayor 
system, the Mayor's argument is also wrong because it gives "undue emphasis" on the 
term "governing body." See Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027. Specifically, the Mayor 
argues that as a member of the "governing body" he must have some say in the actual 
passage of the Resolution—by vote, veto, or otherwise. However, the term "governing 
body" is not an independent source of power. Instead, as this Court has already found, 
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the legislature's "use of the term[] . . . 'governing body ' must be deemed to have been in 
[its] genenc sense only and not an attempt to designate the functions of any particular 
governing body" Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). In other words, if the Mayor is part of 
the municipalities "governing body/5 it is only in a generic sense and in the same manner 
that the President is a member of the governing body of the U.S. or the Governor is a 
member of the governing body of the State of Utah. Being a part of this generic 
"governing body" confers no additional rights, power, or authority on the Mayor beyond 
those which the legislature has otherwise conferred upon him. 
The generic meaning given to the term "governing body" especially makes sense 
in the context of the council-mayor system because there is not a single, formal 
"governing body" in this system. Instead, the Utah Code provides: 
Each municipality shall have a governing body which shall exercise the 
legislative and executive powers of the municipality unless the municipality 
is organized with separate executive and legislative branches of 
government. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-101 (emphasis added). In other words, when a municipality has 
adopted a optional form of government, there is not necessarily "a governing body" 
holding municipal powers. Instead, the powers of an optional form of government are 
established within that form's specific definition under the Act. Nowhere in the Act's 
For example, the definition of the council-manager form of government 
expressly names the council as the "governing body." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1209(l)(b). 
The Mayor and the League rely in part on this provision to argue that the 
"governing body" of the council-mayor form is the Council and the Mayor jointly. 
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definition of the council-mayor system is there a reference to "a governing body." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(a). Instead, the whole of the government is divided 
between the two branches of government. Id. 
This Court has already interpreted the council-mayor form in this manner. For 
example, in Biddle, the Court stated: "[T]he legislature clarified its intent to distinguish 
the traditional system—where power is vested solely in a single governing body—from 
the new council-mayor system—where the vested power is shared by the mayor and the 
council." 993 P.2d at 879; see Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1028 (stating that "it is not 
surprising that [Utah Code provisions that pre-date the council-mayor form] contemplate 
only a single governing body exercising both legislative and executive powers"). 
In sum, because the term "governing body" is merely generic, especially in the 
context of the council-mayor form of government, defining the Mayor as a part of it does 
not confer upon the Mayor any powers not otherwise vested in him. Thus, because the 
Mayor does not otherwise have the power to vote on, veto, disapprove, or otherwise 
reject a resolution under Section 1203, he remains divested of them. 
This conclusion does not render the Mayor powerless as Appellants suggest. 
(League's Br. ait 22.) To the contrary, the Mayor does have some power. However, those 
(League Br. at 13-14.) Section 1209(l)(b) does not support this argument. Instead, the 
fact that the council-manager form of government defines a "governing body," and the 
council-mayor form does not, simply evidences the legislature's intent that no singular 




powers are confined to those enumerated by the legislature. Specifically, he can "attend 
all meetings of the council with the right to take part in all discussions . . . and to make 
recommendations and freely give advice to the council." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1219(2)(g). 
d. The Mayor's and League's Interpretation of Section 1203 Would 
Create an Anamolous Form of Government. 
If Section 1203 were interpreted to allow the Mayor to vote on, veto, disapprove, 
or otherwise reject the Resolution, it would create an "anomalous form of government" 
which would disregard the separation-of-powers principal and give way to a super-
mayor. See Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027. Indeed, not only would the Mayor retain all 
executive powers, the Mayor would also have legislative powers equal to those of the 
City Council when addressing a resolution under Section 1203. Neither on the state level 
nor on the federal level does the executive branch have authority to be directly involved 
in such a purely legislative decision. {See Holladay Citizens Br. at 13-16 (discussing 
executives' non-role in constitutional amendment processes).) As this Court has 
recognized, such "anomalous form[s] of government not heretofore known [are] not 
intended by the Act." Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1027. 
Just as the City Council has spheres of influence over which the Mayor plays no 
determinative role, such as resolutions under Section 1203, the Mayor (as with every 
other executive) has his own sphere of influence over which the legislative branches have 
no input. See, e.g., Martindale, 581 P.2d at (holding that "the management of city 
property, including its sale and purchase, is an executive function reserved to the Mayor" 
with which the city council cannot interfere). 
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e. Interpreting Section 1203 to Allow the City Council to Pass a 
Resolution Does Not Destroy the Concept of "Checks and 
Balances." 
The Mayor and the League suggest that interpreting Section 1203 in such a 
manner that the Mayor would have no direct impact on passing a Resolution would 
"destroy entirely the checks and balances built into the council-mayor form of 
government." (League Br. at 19.) This assertion is incorrect. The check and balance for 
legislation (i.e., a government's imposition of its collective will) is found in the 
separation of the executive from the legislature, both of which have roles to play in the 
legislative process. For a ballot proposition (i.e., the citizens9 imposition of its collective 
will) the voters themselves act as the check and balance. 
The fact that the Mayor cannot "check and balance" the Council's decision to pass 
a Resolution under Section 1203 is neither surprising nor unusual. As both the Mayor 
and the League concede, changing forms of government pursuant to Section 1203 is akin 
to amending a constitution. The processes for amending the U.S. or Utah constitutions 
do not contain a check-and-balance procedure between the two branches. In both cases, 
neither the President nor the Governor have a say whatsoever in amending their 
respective constitutions. (See Holladay Citizens Br. at 15-16.) 
B. The Election Cannot Be Avoided Based on the Mayor's Subjective Belief that 
the So-Called "Instigators" Used the Resolution as a "De Facto Recall/9 
Departing from the real issue in this case—whether the Mayor can in some 
manner void a resolution considered under Section 1203—the Mayor and the League try 
to ascertain the motives behind the Resolution and then argue that those motives are 
SaltLake-208780.1 0045315-00002 
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grounds for avoiding the citizens' vote as a "de facto recall." (Mayor Br. at 21-22.) This 
argument is meritless. First, the Mayor's characterization that the election was a "de 
facto recall" is contrary to Utah law. In Biddle, the Court rejected a mayor's argument 
that, once elected, he was entitled to serve out his term regardless of a change of 
government. 993 P.2d at 881-82. In doing so, the Court stated: "[I]n the instant case, 
the electorate . . . affirmatively voted to change their form of government [under the Act], 
which action consequently cut short the term of office for the former mayor. That 
process is not the same as 'removing9 an elected official." Id. at 882. The same is true in 
this case. 
Second, motives for pursuing a special election play no part whatsoever in 
whether the election is valid. Motives for wanting a change in the form of government 
(like anything else political) are subjective, wide-ranging, are easily mischaracterized 
Even assuming the worst—that those who advocated for the Resolution before the 
Council and those on the Council who passed the Resolution did so simply to get rid of 
the Mayor—those motives are not grounds for avoiding a procedurally proper election. 
Indeed, Appellants have cited no case, and Holladay Citizens could find none, in which a 
procedurally valid election was voided by a court because of the motives behind the 
election. What the Mayor and the League ignore is the fact that it was the citizens of 
Holladay that ultimately decided to vote-out the Mayor. 
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C. Appellants Have Not Marshaled the Evidence to Challenge the Trial Court's 
Factual Findings, 
The District Court found that, even if the Mayor had the right to vote on or veto 
the Resolution, he did not do so. (See Holladay Citizens Br. at 19.) Neither the Mayor 
nor the League marshal the evidence to challenge these findings. In fact, they reinforce 
these findings by stating: "[t]he Mayor cannot be held accountable for 'failing' to vote 
when, in fact, he knew that his vote was prohibited, there was no voting procedure in 
place for him, and he was accustomed to rendering this approval or disapproval outside 
of council meeting." (Mayor Br. at 17.) Given the statements made by the Mayor at the 
June 19 Council Meeting, the District Court's findings that the Mayor did not vote 
against, and in fact approved, the Resolution are not clearly erroneous. 
D. The Act Is ConstitutionaL 
The Mayor argues that the Act is unconstitutional on its face because it does not 
allow adequate notice to the electorate, even though adequate notice of the election was 
actually provided. On the merits of this issue, Holladay Citizens adopts and incorporates 
the arguments contained in the City of Holladay's Reply Brief. 
Besides being wrong on the merits, the artificial nature of this argument is 
demonstrated by the League's actions at the District Court level. Specifically, the City 
sought and obtained permission from the District Court to provide notice of the election 
21 days beforehand. The League thereafter sought a preliminary injunction to preclude 
SaltLake-208780.1 0045315-00002 
14 
the City from giving the voters this much notice. (Mem in Support of Emerg. Mot. for 
Reconsideration & TRO (attached as Tab 1), at 2-5.) In doing so, the League stated: 
The publication of notice beginning this week is not necessary under Utah 
law. . . . Such publication is unnecessary and gratuitous.... The earliest 
required deadline is fifteen days before the election . . . . There will be 
ample time, therefore, for [the City] to prepare for the election . . . 
especially since the election involves only one ballot question Movant 
will suffer irreparable harm . . . because public funds will be expended on 
unnecessary steps in preparation for the proposed election. The threatened 
injury to Movant. . . outweighs any damage to Petitioner, because the 
publication and printing steps are not required of [the City] at this time. 
{Id. at 4-5.) The League itself—who purports to represent a group of Holladay voters— 
not only did not think that the notice requirements were deficient, it sought to have less 
notice than the City wanted to give. This version of "hot-box" that the Mayor and the 
League are playing evidences the hollowness of the constitutional claim. 
m. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the decision of the District 
Court and hold that the Mayor had no authority to vote for, veto, or disapprove of the 
Resolution and the election on August 5, 2003 approving the Resolution to change 
Holladay5 s form of government was proper. 
9
 Generally, this pleading would have a Record citation. However, because the 
Record in this case has not yet been complied and numbered, Holladay Citizens attached 
this pleading as an addendum. 
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t\ ^K DATED this L \ day of August, 2003. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Martin K. Banks 
Mark E. Hindley 
Attorneys for Intervenor Holladay Citizens 
for Progress 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re HOLLADAY CITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION NO. 03-34 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Case No. 0309014851 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1, On Wednesday, July 2, 2003, Petitioner in this matter filed the original 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Petition for Expedited Scheduling Conference and 
Expedited Hearing. 
2. On Monday, July 7, 2003, the Court held an in camera meeting attended 
by counsel for numerous interested parties, including counsel for Movant. 
3. No motion for temporary restraining order, injunction, or other form of 
extraordinary or immediate relief was filed or made by Petitioner on the record on July 7, 
2003 or prior thereto. 
4. Counsel for Petitioner represented to the Court in camera on July 7, 2003 
that notice of an August 5, 2003 special election for the City of HoUaday was required to 
be published once a week for three consecutive weeks beginning on Sunday, July 13, 
2003, and that said notice of publication needed to be delivered to the relevant 
newspapers by Wednesday, July 9, 2003. 
5. The Court entered a directive in camera on July 7, 2003, after discussion 
with counsel, that notice of the election be delivered to the relevant newspapers by July 9, 
2003, for publication beginning July 13, 2003. 
6. In addition, counsel for Petitioner is currently taking steps to prepare for 
the printing of ballots and absentee ballots. 
ARGUMENT 
When counsel for various parties met in camera with the Court on July 7, 2003, 
no motion by Petitioner for temporary restraining order, injunction or other form of 
immediate or extraordinary relief was made, nor was such a motion then pending. 
Counsel for Movant therefore was unable to adequately respond to statements made to 
the Court by Petitioner's counsel, and was similarly unable to adequately respond to the 
in camera directive pronounced by the Court. 
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After extensive research, and after consultation with counsel for Petitioner and 
with the Utah state elections office. Movant has been unable to discover any authority for 
the statement by Petitioner's counsel that publication of the proposed August 5, 2003 
special election must be made three weeks before the election. The language concerning 
notice contained in the Resolution drafted by Petitioner's counsel at page two ("the first 
publication thereof shall not be less than twenty-one (21) days nor more than thirty five 
(35) days before the special election") appears to have been taken from Utah Code 
section 11-14-3. This statutory section, however, applies only to municipal bond 
elections, and does not apply to the proposed August 5, 2003 Holladay special election. 
After research and consultation with the state elections office. Movant believes 
that the deadlines which apply to the proposed Holladay special election are those found 
in sections 20A-5-405 and 20A-5-602. These sections require preparation of absentee 
ballots and appointment of election judges fifteen days before the election, and 
publication of a sample ballot seven davs before the election. In addition, section 20A-5-
101 requires the city election officer to publish notice of the date, polling places, and 
qualifications to vote at least two davs before the election. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a taxpayer has standing to prosecute an 
action against municipalities to enjoin unlawful expenditures. Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 
592, 600 (Utah 2003). Movant is a non-profit group composed of tax-paying citizens of 
the City of Holladay. Any steps which are taken toward the August 5, 2003 election 
while the validity of that election is pending before this Court will require the expenditure 
3 
of public funds. The Court's justification for its directive of July 7. 2003 was that all 
necessary steps for the election need to be taken in case the Court ultimately rules that the 
election is valid. Apparently, however, the publication of notice beginning this week is 
not necessary under Utah law. Movant therefore objects to such publication because it 
will require the use of taxpayer funds and will impair the interests of Movant. 
Furthermore, the relief directed by the Court in camera on July 7, 2003 is 
extraordinary relief. Counsel for Petitioner, however, failed to meet, or even attempt to 
meet, the requirements under Rules 65 A, 65B, or any other provision, for entry of such 
relief. No immediate or irreparable harm was proven. No consideration of the competing 
public interests was attempted. No motion for any such relief was filed with the Court. 
No notice or opportunity to respond to any such request was given to adverse parties. 
The fact that Movant has now hastily identified potential errors in Petitioner's informal 
representations to the Court illustrates the prejudice to which Movant has been subjected 
by Petitioner's actions. 
For the above reasons. Movant requests that the Court reconsider and rescind its 
in camera directive concerning publication of notice of the proposed election. Such 
publication is unnecessary and gratuitous, and therefore will unduly prejudice Movant's 
interests in challenging the legitimacy of the proposed election. For these same reasons, 
Movant also requests the entry of a temporary restraining order enjoining further 
preparation for said election by Petitioner until after the hearing scheduled by the Court 
for July 15, 2003. The earliest required deadline is fifteen days before the election, or 
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Monday, July 21, 2003. There will be ample time, therefore, for Petitioner ^prepare for 
the election following the July 15, 2003 hearing, especially since the election involves 
only one ballot question. 
Movant's motion satisfies the requirements under Rule 65A for a temporary 
restraining order. Movant will suffer irreparable harm if the order does not issue, because 
public funds will be expended on unnecessary steps in preparation for the proposed 
election. The threatened injury to Movant - the expenditure of public funds and the 
unnecessary advertisement of an election that may not happen - outweighs any damage 
to Petitioner, because the publication and printing steps are not required of Petitioner at 
this time. For these same reasons, the requested order is not adverse to the public 
interest. Finally, the case clearly presents serious issues on the merits which should be 
the subject of further litigation, in that this is the first known attempt by a city council 
under the strong mayor form of government to end a sitting mayor's term prematurely by 
unilateral passage of a resolution proposing a change in form of government. There is 
also a substantial likelihood that Movant will prevail on the merits, in that the unilateral 
passage by a city council under a council-mayor form of government of a resolution to 
reorganize the city's government constitutes an illegitimate weapon wielded by one 
branch of government against an equal and coordinate branch of government and is 
clearly prohibited under relevant Utah statutes and legal authority. 
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For all of the above reasons, Movant respectfully requests that the Court 
reconsider and vacate its directive of July 7, 2003 and enter a temporary restraining order 
enjoining further preparation for the proposed election until after July 15, 2003. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S dav of July, 2003. 
TESCH GRAHAM P.C. 
is - * * * ^ 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorneys for Holladay Preservation League 
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